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“Only one obligation”: Kant on the Distinction and the Normative Continuity of 
Ethics and Right 
1. An unanswered question 
The various interpretations of Kant’s view on the relationship between morals and right can 
be roughly distinguished in those maintaining that right is dependent from morals and those 
maintaining that right is independent.  The contrast between the Independence Thesis and the 1
Dependence Thesis, especially if stated in so general terms, oversimplifies the matter, of course, and 
is in need of qualification. It not always clear, for instance, from what exactly right is meant to be 
dependent or independent, as it is sometimes forgotten or ignored that Kant rather consistently 
keeps a distinction between morals broadly understood (Moral or Sittenlehre), i.e. as encompassing 
the whole of practical philosophy, and ethics in a narrow sense (Ethik) as a specific treatment of 
ethical, i.e. non-juridical duties. If these simple terminological and systematical coordinates are not 
taken into account, it cannot become clear if right is supposed to be independent from the theory 
of specific moral demands in the current sense (i.e. Kant’s ethics) of from the general theory of 
moral demands, or moral normativity (roughly, Kant’s “morals”). 
With this caveat in the background, I would like to focus on a different, yet connected issue 
concerning Kant’s view on the relationship between right and ethics. Both the Independence and 
the Dependence Thesis often refer to a “traditional conception” with which Kant’s view would 
have some connection. Allen Wood, for instance, argues that “Kant rejects the common idea that 
the sphere of right, including the philosophy of law and politics, consists merely in an application 
of general moral principles to the specific circumstances of law or the political state”.  Especially 2
some variants of the Independence Thesis stress that Kant’s account of the relationship between 
right and ethics is characterised by the presence of elements of both the “traditional conception” 
 See e.g. the helpful general survey on the stand of the research in R. Mosayebi, Das Minimum der reinen 1
praktischen Vernunft. Vom kategorischen Imperativ zum allgemeinen Rechtsprinzip bei Kant, Berlin–Boston, 
DeGruyter, 2013. See now also the detail critical remarks in Chr. Horn, Nichtideale Normativität. Ein neuer 
Blick auf Kants politische Philosophie, Berlin, Suhrkamp, 2014, chap. 1.
 A. Wood, “The Independence of Right from Ethics”, in A. Wood, The Free Development of Each. Studies 2
on Freedom, Right, and Ethics in Classical German Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, 
70-89: 72.
and of a new, different conception. Kant’s position would thus represent a transition from the 
traditional understanding of right and ethics to a new one.  3
It is quite clear what the interpreters suggesting this account hold the traditional view to be: 
that would be the thesis that right is dependent from morals (in which sense?) or from general 
moral principles.  It is not clear at all, though, how this reading should square with the state of the 4
discussion that Kant was reacting to. It is not clear, namely, which traditional conception are we 
talking about. In fact, at least two very different views were opposed, before Kant, the Wolffian and 
the Thomasian. On the Wolffian interpretation, all the parts of practical philosophy build a 
systematic unity governed by one and the same principle, while the Thomasian interpretation 
centers on a strict separation between right and ethics. So we would have either no real distinction, 
or a quite sharp one, in fact stronger than the Independence Theorists maintain. More importantly, 
if we simply refer to a(n undisputed?) traditional view, we don’t see any reason why Kant should 
engage with the issue in the first place. If a generally accepted “traditional conception” would be in 
place, it would appear that Kant’s transition to a new view would take place as a sort of side effect of 
his new position in moral philosophy in general, especially if you consider that he officially holds to 
the traditional view, as the Independence interpretation has it. It would appear, in other words, 
that, while Kant works in continuity with the official conception, developing his new philosophical 
perspective leads him to a different conception. This picture does not strike me as much plausible. 
Now, even if they sometimes mention Thomasius and his separation between ethics and 
right, the interpreters who put forward some variant of the Independence Thesis might reply that 
their aim is not to provide an historically adequate picture of the discussions in practical philosophy 
prior to Kant, so that the accuracy of what they take the “traditional conception” to be is ultimately 
not essential to their interpretive arguments — essential is rather to point out a tension, or a 
transition, in Kant’s thought between two different, incompatible conceptions, which might as well 
be labelled “conception 1” and “conception 2”, to set aside any historical implication or any 
reference to Kant’s philosophical context. This defence might help the inner consistency of the 
Independence interpretation, but thereby we would lose, I believe, an important clue for the 
understanding of Kant’s view. Indeed, if we do consider what conceptions Kant was confronted 
 See especially M. Willaschek, “Why the Doctrine of Right Does not Belong in the Metaphysics of Morals. 3
On Some Basic Distinctions in Kant’s Moral Philosophy”, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik/Annual Review of 
Law and Ethics 5 (1997), 205-227, and M. Willaschek, “Right and Coercion. Can Kant’s Conception of Right 
be Derived from his Moral Theory?”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2009), 49-70.
 Cf. Willaschek, “Right and Coercion”.4
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with, we can obtain a more accurate picture of his own position. We would see, namely, that in fact 
in Kant’s times there was no “traditional view” to endorse or reject, and that there was rather an 
issue that Kant aimed to solve.  
Precisely because the distinction was not acknowledged as stable and clear, in the last decades 
of the eighteenth century, many German writers strongly felt the urgent need of a clarification of 
the relationship between right and morals. The terminological difference between ethics and right 
had meanwhile become current, but was not properly justified.  Indeed, one of the elements of the 5
general crisis of natural law at the end of the 18th century consists in the lack of clarity on this 
fundamental issue.  Kant shares this general feeling and explicitly mentions the open issue as one 6
prominent reason to deal with the topic: “One does not as yet know how to determine from 
principles the place for jus naturae in practical philosophy on the basis of principles and to show 
the border between jus naturae and morals” (XXVII 1321).  According to the Vigilantius notes, still 7
in the 1790s Kant insists that “the determination of the supreme principle of distinction […] has 
never till now been worked out” (XXVII 539).   8
The issue is not merely systematic or ‘architectonic’, but has obvious practical implications, 
e.g. in the justification of the juridical practices and in determining their contents, as well as 
philosophical consequences. The effects of the lack of a proper distinction between right and ethics 
can be seen, for instance, in Mendelssohn’s view that the normative validity of contracts is founded 
on a duty of love.  Such an example shows that any continuity between some “traditional view” 9
 See for instance the examples mentioned by D. von der Pfordten, “Kants Rechtsbegriff”, Kant-Studien 98 5
(2007), 431-442. 
 See D. Klippel, “Ideen zur Revision des Naturrechts: Die Diskussion zur Neubegründung des deutschen 6
Naturrechts um 1780”, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik / Annual Review of Law and Ethics 8 (2000), 73–90: 
75 ff.; D. Klippel, “Das deutsche Naturrecht am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts”, in V. Fiorillo, F. Grunert (eds.), 
Das Naturrecht der Geselligkeit. Anthropologie, Recht und Politik im 18. Jahrhundert, Berlin, Duncker & 
Humblot, 2009, 301-325, e.g. footnote 37.
 Pace M. Baum, “Recht und Ethik in Kants praktischer Philosophie”, in J. Stolzenberg (ed.), Kant in der 7
Gegenwart, Berlin–New York, De Gruyter, 213-226: 213, these remarks cannot be referred only to the limits of 
the Wolffian position, but to a limit shared also by the other conceptions. (I thank Fred Rauscher for making 
his translation of these and other passages from the Naturrecht Feyerabend available to me in advance to the 
publication of the corresponding volume of the Cambridge Edition.)
 The translation of the passages from Kant’s writings are taken from the corresponding volumes of the 8
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, where available.
 On this, see H. Dedek, “Duties of Love and Self-Perfection: Moses Mendelssohn’s Theory of Contract”, 9
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 32 (2012), 713-739.
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and Kant’s own is in fact unlikely. In fact, the previous conceptions determine the state of the 
discussion that Kant rejects and aims to correct, by putting forward a different view. 
Looking at how his arguments relate to that stand of the discussion in his times contributes 
to a better understanding of Kant’s own position in this matter. A look at the philosophical 
background provided by the main competing views Kant had before him should help to put his 
view in the right perspective and to assess how he construes the relationship between right and 
ethics. I shall contrast the terms of the pre-Kantian debate with Kant’s take on the matter, in order 
to point out how Kant gains a new perspective concerning the relationship between ethics and 
right, which cannot be regarded as corresponding to the previous ones, not even in the general 
outline. While his contemporaries, after waiting for Kant’s doctrine of right for a long time, were 
disappointed and thought that Kant ultimately did not go beyond the early modern natural law 
theories, I suggest that it is important to highlight, on the contrary, the main features with which 
his view re-defines the terms of earlier debates.  
2. Kant’s middle way between competing conceptions 
The need of a clear account of the relationship between right and ethics arises from the limits 
of the main positions in natural law prior to Kant. The complexity of the issue is apparent in the 
Wolffian view. (The differences among Wolff and the Wolffians on this matter are of rather scarce 
relevance as to general outline.) Following a tradition going back to the late Scholastics, Wolff 
acknowledges many different meanings of the notion of natural law. Aside from natural law in the 
broadest sense, that Wolff and the Wolffians take to embrace the whole of reality as an order created 
by God,  two meanings of ‘natural law’ are relevant here. The natural law in the broad sense (ius 10
naturale late dictum) is the complex of all moral obligations (at least those cognisable through mere 
reason), and in fact embraces the entire practical philosophy. In this sense ius is synonymous of 
‘morals’ or ‘moral philosophy’ (Sittenlehre),  which would suggest a dependence of ethics from 11
right rather than the other way around. Some unclarity arises especially when Wolff introduces the 
new discipline of universal practical philosophy: The official Wolffian view is that, the function of 
 Cf. e.g. A. G. Baumgarten, Initia philosophiae practicae primae, Halle 1760 (reprinted in AA XIX 7-91), § 10
65: “Jus naturae latissimum leges naturales omnes complectitur”.
 Cf. e.g. G. Achenwall, Ius naturae, editio septima, Göttingen 1774, § 26: “scientia legum naturalium 11
appellatur ius naturale (naturae) latius et obiective sumtum; atque hoc significatu Iuris Naturalis 
synonimum est Philosophia Moralis”. See also M. Scattola, “Die Naturrechtslehre Alexander Gottlieb 
Baumgartens und das Problem des Prinzips”, Aufklärung 20 (2008), 239–265.
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natural law in the broader sense is to present a general “theory of practical philosophy”, but it is not 
very clear how this should relate to universal practical philosophy, since the latter should provide a 
general foundation of the entire practical philosophy, encompassing, among other topics, a theory 
of the law of nature and of the corresponding obligation or bindingness.  On the lower level, 12
natural law in the strict sense (ius naturale stricte dictu) is specifically the doctrine of external 
obligations.  In this sense, ius is on the same level as the doctrine of internal obligations, i.e. ethics,  13 14
as they both depend from the general principles set out in natural law in the broad sense.  
For Wolff and the Wolffians, therefore, the distinction between right and ethics is not really 
problematic. In applying to specific matters to generate a doctrine of duties, moral philosophy 
specifies in two branches, according to the sphere of application: the individual or society. The 
special practical philosophy thus differentiates in ethics (philosophia specialis moralis) and politics, 
or “civil practical philosophy” (philosophia specialis civilis).  The very same rational and natural 15
principle (“Do what makes you and your condition, or that of others, more perfect; omit what 
makes it less perfect”) simply applies to both domains. The dissatisfaction — not only on Kant’s 
part — with such a framework is understandable. A Wolffian position seems unable to make sense 
of the issue of a clear distinction between the two spheres that does not merely amount to 
distinguishing two fields of application. This weakness leaves unexplained many significant 
differences between ethics and right. In fact, the Wolffian position seems unable to even 
acknowledge the problem. Interestingly, Kant’s “author” in the natural law courses, Achenwall, is 
probably, among the Wolffians, the most acutely aware of the issue.   16
However, Kant shares with Wolff and the Wolffians a crucial point. For Wolff, in the specific 
sense, ius, ‘right’, primarily means a moral power, that is, a facultas moralis, that is, means not a 
complex of laws, but a subjective right. In this respect he follows a tradition going back at least to 
 On this compare Chr. Wolff, Ratio praelectionum Wolﬁanarum in Mathesin et Philosophiam universam, 12
Halle 1735, reprint Hildesheim, Olms, 1972, VI § 1 and § 5. Remarkably, Wolff’s Ausführliche Nachricht does 
not even mention natural law.
 Cf. Baumgarten, Initia, § 65.13
 Cf. A. G. Baumgarten, Ethica philosophica, editio tertia, Halle 1763, reprint Hildesheim, Olms, 1969, § 1.14
 Wolff, Ratio praelectionum, VI § 25.15
 See also K. Bärthlein, “Die Vorbereitung der Kantischen Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie in der 16
Schulphilosophie”, in H. Oberer, G. Seel (eds.), Kant: Analysen-Probleme-Kritik, Würzburg, Königshausen 
& Neumann, 1988, 221-271. On Achenwall’s influence on Kant see B. S. Byrd, J. Hruschka, Kant’s Doctrine of 
Right. A Commentary, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 15 ff.
!5
Suárez, but stresses this aspect quite strongly, and holds that subjective right is the only proper 
meaning of ius. (He even complains about the ambiguity between ius and law in the vernacular 
languages.)  Wolff maintains that a subjective right derives from a prior natural obligation.  More 17 18
specifically, on his account a right derives from a permissive law that gives a subject a moral power.  19
In this respect, Kant’s view is rather close to Wolff’s. For Kant too, the dimension of right is 
primarily the dimension of subjective right, not of speciﬁc laws that constitute the juridical domain 
as such.  Duties of right are only derivative, as they originate from a right in this sense.  Kant 20 21
expresses the same relation speaking of a “duty corresponding to the right [dem Recht 
correspondirende Pﬂicht]” (XXIII 258). For this reason, according to Kant’s clarification in the 
Doctrine of Right, “the moral concept of right” indicates a “right, insofar as it is related to an 
obligation corresponding to it” (VI 230). Analogously, in ethics duties derive only from objective 
ends, and not the other way around. With the very same formulation, Kant speaks of a “duty 
corresponding to the end [dem Zweck correspondirende Pﬂicht]”.  Furthermore, like Wolff, Kant 22
maintains that the subjective right derives from a prior obligation, which he understands as the 
obligation of the moral law, that makes a moral subject of the rational subject: right (specifically 
strict right) “is indeed based on everyone’s consciousness of obligation in accordance with a 
law” (VI 232).  
Here a major difference with respect to Wolff is that the right arises from obligation not 
directly, i.e. not as a result of a permission, but via the faculty of freedom: “we know our own 
freedom (from which all moral laws, and so all rights as well as duties proceed) only through the 
 See on this B. Tierney, Liberty and Law. The Idea of Permissive Natural Law, 1100-1800, Washington, 17
D.C., The Catholic University of America Press, 2014, 313.
 Cf. Chr. Wolff, Jus naturae methodo scientiﬁca pertractatum, I, Halae 1740, reprint Hildesheim, Olms, 18
1972, §§ 23, 25, 26.
 Cf. Chr. Wolff, Jus naturae, § 55; Chr. Wolff, Philosophia practica universalis, methodo scientiﬁca 19
pertractata, Pars prior […], Francofurti et Lipsiae 1738, reprint Hildesheim–New York, Olms, 1971, §§ 156, 
159.
 See J. Hruschka, “Kants Rechtsphilosophie als Philosophie des subjektiven Rechts”, Juristenzeitung 59 20
(2004), 1085-1092, and also Th. Mautner, “How Rights Became ‘Subjective’”, Ratio Juris 26 (2013), 111-132.
 For this reason it might be misleading to focus on the difference between doctrine of right and doctrine of 21
virtue as theories and systems of duties; see e.g. Mosayebi, Das Minimum der reinen praktischen Vernunft. 
The primary – or, at any rate, the most significant – difference is between right and ethics. The other ones 
belong to secondary levels and depend on it.
 Note that this also suggests that Kant never means to carry out a direct derivation of specific duties from 22
the fundamental principle, but that they are developed only through forms of freedom like the subjective 
right or the objective ends.
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moral imperative, which is a proposition commanding duty, from which the capacity for putting 
others under obligation, that is, the concept of a right, can afterwards be explicated [entwickelt]” (VI 
239). The obligation imposed by the moral law provides through the fundamental constraint on 
actions the foundations for right like for any other normatively relevant status. The concept of 
right has actual normative force only if it draws on the moral law as law of freedom. This 
fundamental connection marks a crucial feature of Kant’s account, which shall prove essential to his 
view on the relation between right and ethics. 
Considering the similarity between Kant’s and Wolff’s view that consists (1) in the primacy of 
the subjective sense of right, and (2) in the justification of right through moral obligation, helps to 
rectify some interpretive remarks. Some interpreters have emphasised, namely, that Kant conceives 
of right in terms of a faculty, which they take to entail that Kant does not conceive of right in terms 
of duties, and this would in turn show that for him ‘right’ does not depend on any moral 
obligation, so that the right as a power, or authorisation, is not properly moral.  Indeed, Kant does 23
think of right primarily in terms of a subjective right, and does not derive juridical duties directly 
from a moral obligation, but from the subjective right.  Contrarily to the Independence 24
interpretation, though, the primacy of subjective right does not ipso facto cut off any link between 
right and moral obligation. That happens only if we disregard that, for Kant, right does derive from 
a prior obligation, which he understands as the obligation imposed by the fundamental moral law. 
The base for any subjective right lies in the status of being subject to the moral law, which makes 
them aware of being free, and that is precisely what makes it a moral status (‘moral’ in the broad 
sense), as for Kant, much more clearly than for Wolff, any moral status is determined only by the 
moral law (cf. IV 436).   25
The essential link between subjective right and the moral law explains the connection 
between the subjective right(s) of different subjects, that is based on their equal moral status, given 
that they are all subjects to the moral obligation in the same way. The Independence reading leads 
 Th. Pogge, “Is Kant’s Rechtslehre a ‘Comprehensive Liberalism’?”, in M. Timmons (ed.), Kant’s 23
Metaphysics of Morals. Interpretative Essays, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, 133-158: 133 f.; 
Willaschek, “Right and Coercion”.
 See e.g. J. Hruschka, “Kants Rechtsphilosophie als Philosophie des subjektiven Rechts”.24
 On how the principle of right presupposes the concept of person see B. Ludwig, “Sympathy for the 25
Devil(s)? Personality and Legal Coercion in Kant’s Doctrine of Law”, Jurisprudence 6 (2015), 25–44.
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to maintain that which rights has the other depends from which rights I have.  But this makes the 26
connection between the rights of different person empirical. In the same way, we could say that I 
can know to whom I have to be grateful only once it is established who my benefactor is. This does 
not explain that such a relation must hold in the first place, that is, that, as soon as someone benefits 
me, I must be grateful to him or her. Analogously, the connection between subjective rights holds 
not empirically, but on principle, that is, on the basis of the moral law that determines the right. In 
Kant’s view, it is the moral law that explains the connection between rights of different individuals. 
While Kant further develops the broadly Wolffian idea of the connection between right and 
moral obligation in general, a major difference between their views lies in the fact that Kant does not 
hold that such connection entails a direct reduction to the very same principle of the ethical realm. 
Wolff simply applies what he calls the fundamental law of nature (“Do what makes you and your 
condition, or that of others, more perfect”, etc.) throughout, maintaining that not only the same 
normative force, but also the same normative content hold for all aspects of moral life, both in 
ethics and in right. On Kant’s view, beside several further issues and the fundamental problems 
with material principles of morality, the serious weakness of Wolff’s view with regard to this issue is 
that it is unable to account for a difference between right and ethics that does not lie in a mere 
qualification of the material content of the principle, i.e., in Wolff’s case, the perfection of a society. 
By distinguishing different principles of right and ethics, Kant holds to a clear-cut conceptual 
division between the two spheres, which, in contrast to the Wolffians, puts him rather in the wake 
of Thomasius and of those who, following him, maintained a strict distinction between right and 
ethics. However, the main difference between Kant’s view and theirs is of still greater importance. 
In Kant’s eyes, the main disadvantage of such a position is not simply that it lacks a single principle 
encompassing the entire practical domain, but that, lacking such a principle, their view is not able to 
acknowledge a common normativity in right and ethics. On a Thomasian view, there is not (nor can 
be) any normative homogeneity between the two spheres, since only the juridical realm contains 
precepts that enjoy full prescriptive force, that is, only the juridical realm contains genuine 
commands, while ethics merely contains counsels.   27
 See M. Willaschek, “The Non-Derivability of Kantian Right from the Categorical Imperative: A Response 26
to Nance”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2012), 557-564.
 Cf. Chr. Thomasius, Grundlehren des Natur- und Völcker-Rechts, Halle 1709, reprint Hildesheim–New 27
York, 2003, I, IV, §, 86.
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Kant, of course, cannot accept this implication of a distinction between right and ethics, 
which would violate the fundamental assumption of the categorical nature of moral demands 
(moral in the broad sense), that in the Groundwork led to distinguish them from the imperatives of 
prudence (cf. IV 415). Since right and ethics must enjoy the same normative validity, they must 
ground on the same fundamental principle. Along this line, the comparison with Thomasius also 
highlights a weakness of the Independence reading, namely that it implies that the same domain — 
the practical domain, to which both right and ethics e suppositione belong — contains more than 
one fundamental principle with the same normative force, since according to the Independence 
Thesis, it holds both that (a) right and ethics do not rely on the same principle and that (b) they 
both enjoy categorical normative force.  On the contrary, on Kant’s view, the same normative force 28
of juridical and ethical demands requires a common normative ground — if they are to belong to 
the same practical domain, an assumption that Kant is not willing to deny. All categorical demands 
are to be understood as laws of freedom, which Kant conceives of as unified in a system. Therefore, 
right and ethics cannot be separated in a way that makes them depending from different 
fundamental principles. 
3. Internal and external hindrances: Unity and difference within the realm of freedom 
Considering the essential background provided by the main previous competing views, helps 
to see what features make Kant’s account innovative. The comparison with the other views 
highlights some basic desiderata that Kant’s new solution of the issue must meet. An adequate 
account of the distinction between right and ethics should: (a) found both on one fundamental 
principle, on which the entire moral philosophy (the Sittenlehre as such) rests, (b) secure the 
normative homogeneity of the two spheres, (c) explain how the same principle with its categorical 
normative force differentiates itself in different principles developed on the same basis. The key for 
Kant’s solution lies in some conceptual innovations that fully emerge only in the Metaphysics of 
Morals. 
 On Willaschek’s reading, one of the weaknesses, or the unsolved tensions, of Kant’s doctrine of right lies 28
precisely in that it cannot adhere to the assumption of the categorical character of juridical demands, so that 
“juridical laws cannot find expression in categorical imperatives” (Willaschek, “Why the Doctrine of Right”, 
205). See on that the critical remarks in B. Laurence, “Juridical laws as moral laws in Kant’s The Doctrine of 
Right”, in George Pavlakos, Veronica Rodríguez Blanco (eds.), Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical 
Agency, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, 205–227.
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Kant’s main innovation in this respect lies in introducing the distinction between inner and 
outer freedom, which he takes a providing the decisive clue to clarify the relationship between 
ethics and right. While referring to freedom was not new in this respect, Kant here stresses its 
foundational role, trying to find there the path to a solution. A first attempt in this direction is 
recorded in the Feyerabend notes, where, in opposition to then usual accounts of right, Kant 
explains: “Here neither happiness nor a command of duties but freedom is the cause of 
right” (XXVII 1329; cf. XXVIII 1337). Accordingly, “[c]oercion [Zwang] is rightful, when it 
advances universal freedom” (XXVII 1328).  This perspective squares well, of course, with Kant’s 29
fundamental conception of moral demands as laws of freedom. The main problem with such an 
attempt, however, is that it seems to lead to differentiate between right and ethics only because one 
concerns universal freedom and the other concerns individual freedom, which sounds not so 
different from the Wolffian distinction between moral and civil practical philosophy, as if the only 
relevant factor would be the extension of each domain to which the general moral principle is 
applied. 
While employing the difference between inner and outer in related contexts, mainly with 
reference to actions was nothing unusual (an example close to Kant lies in Baumgarten’s distinction 
between internal and external obligations, that I mentioned before), understanding the distinction 
between inner and outer as two aspects of freedom was not as usual prior to Kant. He borrows it 
from Achenwall,  making it especially significant for his own view. That this is the case is suggested 30
by the role that the notions of inner and outer freedom come to play in the Metaphysics of Morals,  31
while they were almost completely absent from earlier writings. In fact, Kant already deployed it 
previously, but never in published texts. A few passages from his private notes and from the lectures 
show that he experimented with the distinction between inner and outer freedom as a key to clarify 
the difference between right and ethics. For instance, already at the time of the Groundwork he 
 See also a parallel, more detailed remark in the coeval Moral Mrongovius II: “Constraint is a hindrance to 29
freedom […]. Resistance to a hindrance to universal freedom advances universal freedom and is therefore 
right. Now, wrong is a hindrance to universal freedom, constraint a hindrance to this hindrance or the 
removal of it; and thus an advancement of freedom.” (I thank Jens Timmermann for making his revised text 
and translation of Mrongovius II available to me.)
 Cf. G. Achenwall, Ius naturae, I, § 70: “libertas consistit in independentia a potestate alterius […]. 30
Distinguenda haec libertas a libertate psychologica seu libertate mentis (§ 7), tamquam interna, indeque 
appellatur etiam iuridica et externa libertas”.
 Cf. VI 396, 405-408, 418, 420 (and XXIII 246). The novelty of the distinction between inner and outer 31
freedom in the Metaphysics of Morals is also pointed out by S. Engstrom, “The Inner Freedom of Virtue”, in 
Timmons (ed.), Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, 289-316: 302, and K. Flikschuh, “Kantian Desires. Freedom of 
Choice and Action in the Rechtslehre”, in Timmons (ed.), Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, 185-208: 191.
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observed: “The conformity to law [Gesetzmäßigkeit] of an action is legality [Legalitaet]. The 
legality of our actions in relation to external freedom is juridical legality; in relation to the use of 
our internal freedom it is ethical legality” (XXIX 630).  When he came to present his final view on 32
the subject, in the Metaphysics of Morals, he needed that distinction to state his position in the 
proper terms. As a matter of fact, the most explicit statement of the crucial role of the distinction 
inner vs outer freedom only occurs later on in the Introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue (§ XIV):  
“This distinction, on which the main division of the doctrine of morals as a whole also rests, is 
based on this: that the concept of freedom, which is common to both, makes it necessary to 
divide duties into duties of outer freedom and duties of inner freedom, only the latter of 
which are ethical” (VI 406).  
The relevance of this statement is underscored by an incidental remark in the Anthropology, 
which similarly mentions as the essential characteristic of the concept of right that “it follows 
directly from the concept of outer freedom” (VII 270). As Kant remarks in the Amphiboly of the 
concepts of reflection in the first Critique, the opposition inner vs outer can be ambiguous. In this 
case, though, the difference cannot be taken to regard the addressees of the actions as self- or other-
regarding, since ethically relevant choices can well concern the relations of the agent with other 
subjects.  The distinction bears, instead, on the two different relations within which freedom as 33
capacity of self-determination faces correspondingly different hindrances.  Inner freedom of a 34
subject is the capacity to determine himself or herself independently from the hindrances given by 
 See also a note from the Nachlaß, that the editors consider rather early, though: “The practical laws from 32
the mere idea of freedom are moral. Those from the idea of inner freedom pertain to all actions and are 
ethical; those merely from the idea of outer freedom are [crossed out: moral] juridical and pertain merely to 
outer actions” (XIX 236; according to the editors of the Academy edition, the note probably stems from the 
years 1776-1778). Significantly, the difference is always employed precisely in the same context and to 
formulate a view quite close to that of the Metaphysics of Morals.
 The difference between right and ethics, thus, is not construed as depending on whether, or how, both are 33
social or not. For an interpretation focusing on this theme see H. Pauer-Studer, “A Community of Rational 
Beings’. Kant’s Realm of Ends and the Distinction between Internal and External Freedom”, Kant-Studien 
107 (2016), 125–159: 130 ff.
 On this see the more detailed discussion in B. Ludwig, “Die Einteilungen der Metaphysik der Sitten im 34
Allgemeinen und die der Tugendlehre im Besonderen”, in A. Trampota, O. Sensen, J. Timmermann (eds.) 
Kant’s “Tugendlehre”. A Comprehensive Commentary, Berlin–Boston, De Gruyter, 2013, 59-84, and 
Pfordten, “Kants Rechtsbegriff”.
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inclinations and impure motives.  Outer freedom is a subject’s capacity to determine himself or 35
herself independently from the influence of any other subject, or from any other will, as Kant 
sometimes says, deploying a more traditional formulation (cf. VI 237).  
Kant’s clarification of the concept of ‘right’ in the Metaphysics of Morals focuses precisely on 
the distinction between these two dimensions of freedom. In fact, there he spells out the meaning 
of the concept of outer freedom without mentioning it: “The concept of right, insofar as it is 
related to an obligation corresponding to it (i.e., the moral concept of right), has to do […] only 
with the outer and indeed practical relation of one person to another, insofar as their actions, as 
deeds, can have (direct or indirect) inﬂuence on each other” (VI 230). Although the formulation 
does not explicitly mention outer freedom as distinct from inner freedom, the correspondence with 
it is confirmed by several passages from the Doctrine of Virtue, where Kant writes, for instance: 
“When, instead of constraint from without, inner freedom comes into play, the capacity for self-
constraint not by means of other inclinations but by pure practical reason (which scorns such 
intermediaries), the concept of duty is extended beyond outer freedom, which is limited only by 
the formal provision of its compatibility with the freedom of all” (VI 396). On Kant’s view, thus, 
there is a fundamental difference between right and ethics, which lies, however, not in their alleged 
derivation from distinct principles or in their application to distinct domains of application, but in 
the different relation within which the subject’s freedom is concerned. The distinction between 
inner and outer freedom points out that what is ultimately relevant, in distinguishing right and 
ethics, is the mode of the relation to the moral faculty of the subjects as a capacity of self-
determination, that is, “insofar as their actions, as deeds, can have (direct or indirect) influence on 
each other”. If the capacity to act morally is concerned in all its aspects, a behaviour is ethically 
relevant. If only the independence of choices from the will of others is concerned, a behaviour is 
juridically relevant. 
In the sphere of ethics the obligation is such that it applies to the individual will as its own 
law, while this is not the case within right. In Kant’s wording, “ethics adds only that this principle 
[i.e. the “principle of duty”, the categorical imperative] is to be thought as the law of your own will 
and not of will in general, which could also be the will of others; in the latter case the law would 
provide a duty of right, which lies outside the sphere of ethics” (VI 389). This is another 
 Cf. V 161: “[…] an inner capacity not otherwise correctly known by himself, the inner freedom to release 35
himself from the impetuous importunity of inclinations so that none of them, not even the dearest, has any 
influence on a resolution for which we are now to make use of our reason”. Cf. also VII 235. See also 
Engstrom, “The Inner Freedom of Virtue”.
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formulation, yet equivalent with the ones I already considered. Right and ethics must be 
differentiated because in the latter the obligation is recognised as grounded within the obligated 
will, while in the former the obligation has its basis in another will. However, right and ethics can 
be distinguished as spheres belonging to the same domain, since in both cases the authority of the 
obligating will is warranted by its status of co-legislator of the fundamental moral law. The 
distinction between right and ethics is thus derivative with respect to the foundations provided by 
the autonomy of the rational will.  All this is encapsulated in the distinction between inner and 36
outer freedom. 
On my reading, the distinction between inner and outer freedom justifies and summarises 
the other differences between right and ethics that Kant spells out. When Kant states that ethical 
demands apply to maxims, while juridical demands only apply to actions (cf. TL, Einl. § VI), he is 
simply making the core of the distinction between inner and outer freedom explicit. From the 
distinction between inner and outer freedom arise the most characteristic features of Kant’s account 
of the distinction between ethics and right within practical philosophy: the reference to an end of 
the choice, or absence thereof, the reference to the moral incentive, or the abstraction from it, 
especially connected with this last point, the difference of legislation, including a reference to the 
incentive or the absence of such a reference (cf. VI 218). 
The main issue with Kant’s way of accounting for the distinction between right and ethics in 
terms of the difference between inner and outer freedom is that he thereby makes the relationship 
between the two aspects of freedom crucial. Some interpreters have also stressed the role of outer 
freedom as determining the boundaries of right, but have also argued on that basis that right must 
thus be regarded as independent of the moral law, because on that account “right is not grounded 
on any end”.  Such a reading, however, obscures that, for Kant, outer freedom does not enjoy 37
separate existence from inner freedom, as freedom in general, both in outer and inner respect, is 
intrinsically connected with the moral law. The awareness of obligation through the moral law 
provides the ground for believing to be free in either respect (cf. VI 238). Thereby the moral law 
does provide the fundamental content of the basic subjective right from which the specific 
postulate of right and any other juridical demands are derived, insofar the status of moral subject as 
 Kant’s differentiation should not be taken to mean, therefore, that only ethics is based on the self-36
legislation of the will, as has been suggested by K. Flikschuh, “Justice without Virtue”, in L. Denis (ed.) 
Kant’s “Metaphysics of Morals”. A Critical Guide, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 51-70.
 Wood, “The Independence of Right from Ethics”, 72.37
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able to determine his or her own actions independently from hindrances constitutes the whole 
content of that basic right (cf. VI 375).   38
Furthermore, Kant’s point about ends not being directly involved in matters of right is 
sometimes taken to mean that right would secure the outer freedom of a subject in order to let him 
be free to pursue his, or her, ends, thereby indirectly contributing to his, or her, pursuing of ends 
(at a formal level, as Kant says).  This reading understandably leads to conclude  But such a reading 39
breaks the continuity both of the obligation and of the practice of freedom, which seem to be the 
primary focus of Kant’s remarks on the matter. In fact, Kant seems to construe the relation between 
the juridical and the ethical perspective in a quite different way than that. The ends that are 
formally relevant in a relationship under juridical laws are, for him, not the ends of the right holder, 
that is, of the person potentially affected by the acts at issue, but primarily the ends of the subjects 
whose outer freedom is constrained by a juridical obligation corresponding to the right of the 
other, that is, the ends of the moral subject whose acts are at issue. The  – because only once the 
obligated has complied with the duty is free to pursue his, or her, ends. Complying with a duty 
corresponding to the right of another person is not so much an indirect contribution to his, or her, 
pursue of ends, as to the agent’s own moral space. As a remark in the lecture notes makes explicit,  
“the first condition of all ethical duties is this, that requital is first given to the juridical 
obligation. The obligation which arises from the right of the other must first be satisfied, for 
if I am also under juridical obligation I am not free, since I am subject to the other’s choice. 
But if I now wish to perform an ethical duty, I wish to perform a free duty; if I am not yet 
free from the juridical obligation, I must first discharge it by fulfilling it, and only then can I 
perform the ethical duty” (XXVII 282).  
The freedom of the same subject is thus constrained by the same normativity in two respects: 
with regard to the right of other subjects, or with regard to his, or her, own objective ends. The 
distinction between the outer and inner freedom focuses precisely on the difference between those 
two relations and their different normative bearing on the subject’s determination of his, or her, 
conduct. 
 Against Wood, “The Independence of Right from Ethics”, 72 f., I thus suggest that outer freedom has not 38
to do with humanity as opposed to personality, that is, with the capacity of moral subjects to set end for 
themselves.
 See Wood, “The Independence of Right from Ethics”, 75. 39
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Kant’s view of the relation between right and ethics, that is, of juridical and ethical demands 
revolves, therefore, around the continuity of obligation throughout both perspective and on the 
corresponding unity of the freedom of the moral subjects. Kant construes the distinction between 
right and ethics as primarily relevant from the standpoint of the first person. Juridical and ethical 
demands have bearing as constraints to the subject’s freedom and can adequately be distinguished 
only drawing on that standpoint, as they address different hindrances to the subject’s freedom. A 
distinction between right and ethics which amounts to construe them as different “spheres”  is, for 40
Kant, too close to the Thomasian view, as it separates two domains which in fact share the same 
fundamental assumptions, as they affect the choices of persons, if in different respects. The basic 
priority of the perspective of obligation combined with the distinction between outer and inner 
freedom allowed Kant to provide a more adequate account. 
4. Conclusion 
This complex elaboration of the distinct, yet profoundly linked spheres of right and ethics 
represents Kant’s transition from the discussion opposing the previous conceptions to a new, 
original view, capable to accommodate both the differences and the unity of right and ethics within 
the realm of morals in the broader sense. What characterises Kant’s view on the relationship 
between ethics and right is primarily a special attention to the complexity of the relationship, which 
motivates the aim of accounting for both the unity of practical philosophy as a whole and the 
diversity of its aspects. In other words, Kant’s view does contain both elements of a traditional view 
and elements of a new view, but they do not bring about any fundamental tension. On the 
contrary, they join in an original account. The novelty and the philosophically interesting core of 
Kant’s view lie in the combination of traditional theses with radically new elements. This allows 
Kant to construe right not as a sort of ‘applied ethics’  resulting from a derivation from general 41
ethical principles, as the Wolffians did, but also to keep it linked with the foundations provided in 
the general account of moral obligation developed in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of 
Morals and in the second Critique.  
The main clue for developing such an account lies in the priority of the concept of 
obligation. In his mature, fully elaborated distinction between right and ethics, thus, Kant’s general 
 See e.g. Wood, “The Independence of Right from Ethics”, 79.40
 Against interpreting Kant’s conception of right in terms of ‘applied ethics’ see also A. Ripstein, Force and 41
Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2009.
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idea seems to go roughly as follows: The awareness of moral obligation, i.e., of the bindingness of 
the moral law, guarantees the freedom of moral subjects, granting them the status of persons. On 
this basis, two dimensions of freedom can be differentiated, without merely separating two perfectly 
distinct realms or “uses” of freedom. Only two relations of freedom are distinguished: a relation to 
the subject’s own capacity of rational self-determination, and a relation to other agents as sources of 
possible hindrance of the subject’s conduct. Yet, in spite of this distinction, freedom is under laws 
that share the same normative force, the one Verbindlichkeit based on the one moral law. As a 
passage from the preliminary notes for the Metaphysics of Morals reads, “[t]here are various duties 
though only one obligation overall in regard to the totality of duty. This latter has no plural” [es 
giebt verschiedene Pflichten[,] aber nur eine Verbindlichkeit überhaupt in Ansehung ihrer aller. 
Letzere hat kein plurale]” (XXIII 250). In fact, it is in virtue of that distinction of aspects of 
freedom that Kant could point at the common ground uniting right and ethics.  It is the 42
categorical imperative that “as such only affirms what obligation [Verbindlichkeit] is” (VI 225).  43
Right and ethics are equally dependent on the preliminary account of moral obligation in general. 
This common ground provides at the same time the key to clarify their mutual relation as different 
aspects of moral obligation. 
In this respect, Kant’s view on the relation between the various aspects of practical life is 
firmly rooted in a radically new, wide-ranging elaboration on the hint provided by Baumgarten’s 
distinction between the doctrine of external obligations and the doctrine of internal obligations, 
both depending from common general principles of obligation.  Kant importantly construes the 44
difference between inner and outer relations in much different terms, namely as different relations 
within the use of freedom as capacity of self-determination. Analogously as in Baumgarten’s 
scheme, however, the unity of practical philosophy is determined by the underlying concept of 
obligation. If Kant holds from the beginning of his work on these topics that the concept of 
obligation determines the most fundamental issue around which the whole project of practical 
 In earlier lectures, Kant seems to separate a “juridical obligation [Verbindlichkeit]”, which does not 42
coincide with the ethical or generally moral: cf. Ethik Kaehler, 77 f.
 For a reading that underscores that the bindingness is the same in right and ethics, see B. Ludwig, 43
“Whence Public Right? The Role of Theoretical and Practical Reasoning in Kant’s Doctrine of Right”, in 
Timmons (ed.), Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, 159-184, and Ludwig, “Die Einteilungen der Metaphysik der 
Sitten”. Cf. also Baum, “Recht und Ethik”.
 Cf. Baumgarten, Initia, § 65 and Ethica, §  1. On the importance of the emphasis put on obligation in 44
Baumgarten’s moral philosophy for Kant’s view see S. Bacin, “Kant’s Lectures on Ethics and Baumgarten’s 
Moral Philosophy”, in Lara Denis, Oliver Sensen (eds.), Kant’s Lectures on Ethics. A Critical Guide, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, 15-33.
!16
philosophy revolves (cf. II 298, IV 453), the entire development of that project deals with the 
different levels and modes of moral obligation. An account of right and ethics must consider them 
as both providing valid moral demands on the basis of the general source of moral bindingness, 
while highlighting how the same normative force can be regarded in different respects.  45
Moral normative force in general has no independent reality from its actual validity in ethical 
and juridical demands, but on Kant’s view the authority of these demands depends on the source of 
their normative force, which he had accounted for in the complex foundational inquiry presented 
before the system of juridical and ethical duties. When the main interpretive options centre on the 
alternative between dependence or independence views, they thereby obscure that the relation that 
Kant meant to clarify was more complex. The whole outline of his view is meant to highlight that 
two relations combine. On a first level, right and ethics are to be regarded as mutually independent, 
insofar the issue is whether their demands are complied with. On the second level, right and ethics 
are to be regarded as depending from a common source of normativity, on which authority they 
both rely as to the binding force of their demands. Therefore I suggest that Kant’s view understands 
the relationship between right and ethics neither as dependence nor as independence, but 
highlights the normative continuity throughout morals instead, to stress that the normative force of 
moral demands is one and the same and enjoys the same validity in right as well as in ethics. On 
Kant’s view, moral bindingness holds in every aspect of moral life and differentiates itself according 
to the different aspects of freedom.  46
 Kant’s project, therefore, cannot allow for an account of the relation between right and ethics entailing 45
that proper bindingness belongs to only one of them. Oddly enough, this is what seems to be suggested in 
G. Zöller, “‘Without Hope and Fear’: Kant’s Naturrecht Feyerabend on Bindingness and Obligation”, in R. 
Clewis (ed.), Reading Kant’s Lectures, Berlin-Boston, De Gruyter, 2015, 346-362. According to Zöller, 
“bindingness (Verbindlichkeit) is separated from juridically justified constraint and from any other 
constraint, and identified with purely moral necessitation” (358). In fact, this not only counters the whole 
structure and the entire development of Kant’s practical philosophy, but also the very passages of the 
Naturrecht Feyerabend which Zöller refers to. Kant’s definition of obligation in XXVII 1326 does not belong 
to his discussion of the difference between ius and ethics, but is preliminary, as it concerns a basic concept 
common to both branches of practical philosophy (as was already in the Wolffian universal practical 
philosophy as well as still in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: cf. VI 222). Accordingly, the very next page of the 
Feyerabend notes reports a use of the concept of obligation (Verbindlichkeit) with regard to a juridical case, 
namely the obligation regarding a contract (cf. XXVII 1327).
 I should like to thank Alice Pinheiro Walla for her very helpful comments on a previous version of my 46
paper, presented in Keele in December 2014, as well as Sorin Baiasu, Adrian Piper, Jens Timmermann and 
other audience at that conference for their remarks.
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abstract: I suggest that looking at how Kant’s arguments relate to the stand of the discussion 
on the relationship between right and ethics in his times contributes to a better understanding of 
his own position in this matter. I contrast the terms of the pre-Kantian debate with Kant’s take on 
the matter, in order to point out how Kant gains a new perspective concerning the relationship 
between ethics and right. While the most prominent pre-Kantian view construed right and ethics as 
either resulting from the application of a general principle to different domains or reciprocally 
independent, Kant’s own account centres on the difference between outer and inner freedom. I 
argue that Kant thereby only differentiates two relations of freedom to different hindrances, 
without implying any separation. This distinction allows him to construe right and ethics as 
sharing the same normative force of moral obligation. Therefore I suggest that Kant’s view 
understands the relationship between right and ethics neither as dependence nor as independence, 
but highlights the normative continuity throughout morals.
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